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Abstract
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an endogenous risk premium, an endogenous primary surplus rule, a generalized
golden rule, a nonseparable utility function, and network externalities. If net-
work eﬀects are suﬃciently strong, an increase in public investment may shift the
economy from a low-growth equilibrium to a steady state characterized by both
higher public debt ratios and higher output growth. This shift may enhance
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1 Introduction
The global financial crisis led governments all around the world to implement massive
bailouts of financial institutions and large fiscal stimulus packages. Combined with a
sharp reduction in tax revenues, itself resulting from sharp contractions in economic ac-
tivity, this policy response led to growing fiscal imbalances in many industrial countries
(see International Monetary Fund (2014, Table 1.1)).1 Although in recent years fiscal
deficits have fallen in some countries, debt-to-GDP ratios have remained stubbornly
high.2
Given this context, the issue of public debt sustainability naturally returned to
the fore of the policy agenda in many industrial countries. But in contrast to pre-
vious episodes of fiscal consolidation, policymakers proved to be clearly aware of the
importance of sustained economic growth for restoring fiscal balance and of the need
to avoid measures, such as cuts in public investment or support for R&D, that would
weaken the economy’s supply side. This was a key motivation for the emphasis on the
need to invest in the provision of productive services, especially infrastructure, in the
composition of stimulus packages. Fiscal policy in industrial countries faces therefore
a double dilemma: restoring public debt sustainability while making sure that growth
is promoted through productive investment.
Although less acute–given that the impact of the financial crisis on fiscal deficits
was not as severe–this dilemma is also present in many middle-income countries where,
to begin with, stocks of infrastructure assets are much lower than in industrial countries.
From an analytical perspective, the key issues are the extent to which public invest-
ment aﬀects growth and fiscal sustainability–without crowding out private investment–
and the degree to which these eﬀects depend on how investment is financed.3 The
1Public debt had actually started to accumulate well before the crisis in some of these countries,
mostly because of rising spending. But the increase in outlays in the aftermath of the global recession
was rapid and large, as some countries borrowed at record levels. Revenue losses and increases in
interest payments were also important factors.
2In the largest developing countries, the impact of the crisis on fiscal deficits was not as severe as
in advanced economies. Moreover, due to sustained growth, debt ratios actually fell in some of these
countries.
3The second issue is related to the debate on whether debt-financed spending on productive public
goods “pays for itself”, in the sense of stimulating suﬃciently economic growth to raise revenues, while
ensuring that the debt-to-output ratio converges to a stable value.
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dynamics of public debt and economic growth have been studied in numerous contri-
butions, including Chalk (2000), De la Croix and Michel (2002), Futagami and Shibata
(2003), Brauninger (2005), Annichiarico and Giammarioli (2008), Fernández-Huertas
and Vidal (2010), and Michel et al. (2010). Chalk (2000) for instance analyzed the
sustainability of bond-financed deficits in a two-period overlapping generations (OLG)
model and established conditions under which a growth rate larger than the interest
rate is a necessary, but not suﬃcient, condition to ensure the sustainability of a perma-
nent budget deficit. Using also an OLG model, De la Croix and Michel (2002) studied
the dynamic eﬀects of the introduction of public debt and derived sustainability con-
ditions. Fernández-Huertas and Vidal (2010) study fiscal sustainability in an economy
where the engine of growth is human capital formation.
However, none of these contributions accounts for the provision of productive public
goods or the dynamics of public capital. This is important because although public debt
accumulation associated with an increase in spending on productive goods subtracts
resources from private capital accumulation, exerting a crowding out eﬀect, it exerts
simultaneously a crowding in eﬀect. Intuitively, as long as the growth in public debt
(which depends on the share of spending allocated to productive public goods and the
share financed by issuing bonds) is not too large, sustained economic growth may be
suﬃcient to prevent unsustainable fiscal imbalances.
A small strand of the literature, which includes Turnovsky (1997, 2004), Greiner
and Semmler (2000), Ghosh and Mourmouras (2004), Ghosh and Nolan (2007), Greiner
(2007, 2011), Futagami et al. (2008), Yakita (2008), Greiner and Flaschel (2010),
Arai (2011), Agénor and Yilmaz (2011), Greiner (2012), Minea and Villieu (2012), and
Teles andMussolini (2014), has indeed focused on the dynamics of productive spending,
public debt, and growth. This paper contributes to this literature in several ways. First,
unlike Ghosh and Nolan (2007), Greiner (2007, 2011), Greiner and Flaschel (2010), and
Agénor and Yilmaz (2011), whose analysis dwells on representative agent intertemporal
models with a unique balanced growth equilibrium, we consider, as in Yakita (2008) and
Arai (2011), an OLG framework. Because the dynamics of consumption are simpler
in basic OLG models with log-linear utility, the study of public debt sustainability
is somewhat easier–and so is the analytical characterization of multiple equilibria.
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Second, and in contrast to the latter two papers, the tax rate is not endogenous. In
those models, as in Brauninger (2005), the government fixes its public deficit objective,
either as the deficit itself in proportion to output or as the share of the budget deficit
to be financed by debt (a criterion consistent with the Maastricht Treaty), and chooses
the tax rate residually from the budget constraint.
In our basic framework, the tax rate, the public spending plan and the structure
of public deficit financing are exogenous, while the budget deficit is endogenous. As a
result, the focus of our analysis is budget realizations, rather than budget objectives.
The sustainability of public debt is thus discussed in terms of the composition of
government spending, rather than a critical level of fiscal deficits. In addition, unlike
Yakita (2008) and Arai (2011), we also account for unproductive spending and transfers
to households, with the latter creating a direct feedback eﬀect between public debt
accumulation, changes in private savings, and private capital formation. Our basic
framework yields a dynamic system that is recursive, and thus simpler to analyze than
Yakita’s, in particular. We also consider extensions that have not been studied before in
the literature, such as an endogenous risk premium and nonlinearities associated with
the productivity eﬀects of public capital. The latter is particularly important from the
perspective of designing fiscal adjustment programs aimed at promoting growth while
ensuring public debt sustainability.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, as in some previous studies,
we show that the steady-state relationship between output growth and the debt-private
capital ratio is unambiguously negative under the golden rule, implying that, with
multiple equilibria, the low- (high-) debt equilibrium is associated with a higher (lower)
growth rate. However, despite this negative relationship, we also show that an increase
in the share of investment in infrastructure has an ambiguous eﬀect on long-run growth.
On the one hand, it raises the debt-private capital ratio, which tends to lower growth;
on the other, it raises the public-private capital ratio, both directly and indirectly. If the
elasticity of output with respect to public capital is suﬃciently high, the steady-state
growth rate of output will increase. We are able to establish this result because, unlike
previous studies, an explicit distinction is made in our model between the elasticities
of output with respect to labor and public capital.
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Second, we show that with an endogenous risk premium (which rises with the debt-
private capital ratio, to capture default risk), the higher the sensitivity of that premium
to the debt-private capital ratio, the more likely it is that multiple equilibria will emerge
if the steady-state value of that ratio is less than unity; in contrast, if the debt-private
capital ratio is too high, it is more likely that there may be no equilibria. This result
is important to understand the (unstable) dynamics of public debt in recent sovereign
debt crises in Europe.
Third, we introduce network externalities associated with public capital, to capture
nonlinearities in its productivity. Until a suﬃciently complex network is built, public
capital has a relatively low (and constant) marginal productivity. Once the main parts
of a network are put together, small additional increases in infrastructure investment
are associated with strong productivity gains; and beyond another level, the marginal
productivity gains induced by additional investments tend to slow down. We find
that although the qualitative features of the dynamics of the debt-private capital ratio
do not change, a steady-state characterized by high growth and high public debt can
now emerge if network eﬀects are suﬃciently strong. A large enough increase in the
share of output allocated to public investment may therefore shift the economy from a
low-growth, low-debt equilibrium to an equilibrium characterized by both higher debt
and higher growth. This shift may be welfare-enhancing as well, particularly so if in
addition to its productivity eﬀects public capital generates some utility benefits. Again,
this result has important implications for the ongoing debate on fiscal consolidation.4
The paper continues as follows. Section 2 presents our basic framework. Section
3 studies the dynamics of the model and establishes conditions under which multiple
equilibria may emerge. Several extensions are considered in Section 4, namely, partial
depreciation, an endogenous risk premium, an endogenous primary surplus rule, a
generalized golden rule, and network eﬀects associated with public capital. The last
section of the paper oﬀers some concluding remarks.
4It is worth noting that our analysis, given its focus on growth and supply-side eﬀects, has ab-
stracted from another important issue in the current debate on public investment–its impact on
aggregate demand and employment in the short run.
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2 A Basic Framework
Consider an OLG economy where a single good is produced and individuals live for
two periods, adulthood and old age. The good can be either consumed in the period
it is produced or stored to yield capital at the beginning of the following period. Each
individual is endowed with one unit of time in each period of life. In adulthood time
is devoted entirely to market work, whereas in old age time is allocated entirely to
leisure. In the first period of life income consists of both wages and a government
transfer, and serves to finance consumption and saving for old age. Savings can be
held in the form of physical capital or government bonds. Endowments at time  = 0
consist of initial stocks of physical capital and government bonds, which are held by
an initial generation of retirees. There are no altruistically-motivated intergenerational
bequests, implying that Ricardian equivalence does not hold.5
Population is constant. In addition to individuals, the economy is populated by
firms and an infinitely-lived government. Firms produce goods using private capital,
labor, and public capital as inputs. The government invests in a productive good and
spends on some unproductive services, including transfers to households. It provides
its services free of charge. It taxes only the wage income of adults and issues one-period
bonds to finance its deficit. All markets clear in equilibrium.
2.1 Households
Expected lifetime utility at the beginning of period  is
 = ln  + ln 
+1
1 +   (1)
where + denotes consumption of generation  individuals at date +  and   0 the
discount rate.
Period-specific budget constraints are given by
 +  = (1− ) +  (2)
+1 = (1 + +1) (3)
5In fact, even with bequests, Ricardian equivalence would not hold here, due to the presence (as
discussed later) of distortionary income taxation.
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where  is the wage rate,  ∈ (0 1) the tax rate,  a government transfer (which the
household takes as given when solving its optimization problem), +1 the rental rate
of private capital, and  saving. To simplify matters, transfers and interest income of
old agents are not taxed.6
The household’s consolidated budget constraint is
 + 
+1
1 + +1 = (1− ) +  (4)
2.2 Firms
There is a continuum of identical firms, indexed by  ∈ (0 1). They produce a single
nonstorable good, which is used either for consumption or investment. Production
requires the use of private inputs, labor and private capital (which firms rent from the
currently old agents), and public capital.
The production function of firm  takes the form
  = ( )( )(  )( )1− (5)
where  denotes the firm-specific stock of capital,  =
R 1
0
  the aggregate
private capital stock, the stock of public capital,  the number of workers employed
by firm ,    0, and  ∈ (0 1). Thus, production exhibits constant returns to scale
in firm-specific inputs,   and  . Public capital in infrastructure is exogenous
to each firm’s production process and aﬀects all individual producers in the same
way. There is also an Arrow-Romer type externality associated with aggregate private
capital. The magnitudes of these externalities are measured by  and , respectively.
In line with much of the empirical evidence reviewed in Bom and Ligthart (2014), we
impose   1.
Markets for both private capital and labor are competitive. Each firm’s objective
is to maximize profits, Π, with respect to labor services and private capital, taking
6For simplicity, we also abstract from government transfers to the old generation (as in Annichiarico
and Giammarioli (2008) or Michel et al. (2010) for instance) and issues associated with social security.
Note also that we do not endogenize labor supply; doing so by incorporating leisure additively in (1)
would not alter qualitatively our results.
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 and  as given:
max
  
Π =   − ( +  ) −   
where  is the rental rate of private capital and  ∈ (0 1) the depreciation rate.
Profit maximization yields, in a symmetric equilibrium,
 = ¯  +  = (1− )  (6)
where ¯ = R 1
0
  is total population, which is normalized to unity in what follows.
The second expression equates the user cost of capital to the gross marginal physical
product of private capital.
Because the number of firms is normalized to 1, aggregate output is given by
 =
Z 1
0
   = ( )( )1+−+ (7)
where  =   is the public-private capital ratio. To ensure balanced growth
(linearity of output in the private capital stock) requires the following assumption:7
Assumption 1:  =  − .
Under Assumption 1, (7) yields aggregate output as
 = ( )  (8)
2.3 Government
The government taxes adults at the constant rate  and spends a total of  on
productive public goods and  on other (unproductive) items, including transfers.
The government budget constraint is
+1 = (1 + ) + + −  (9)
where  is the gross rate of return on government bonds. The expression + −
represents therefore the primary budget deficit.
7If  = 0 then  = , as in various contributions, stemming from Barro (1990). However, this case
is somewhat misleading, as discussed later. Note also that there is a scale eﬀect in production, which
can be eliminated by specifying the Arrow-Romer externality in terms of the ratio of the aggregate
private capital stock to the size of the population.
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Shares of spending are assumed initially to be constant fractions of revenues:
 =   =   (10)
where  ∈ (0 1). Combining (9) and (10) therefore yields
+1 = (1 + ) − [1− ( + )] (11)
Thus, with a primary balance rule,  +  = 1, all taxes are spent on non-interest
outlays, and debt remains constant at zero if 0 = 0; otherwise, it grows autonomously
as long as   0. In contrast, with a primary surplus rule, +  1, the government
uses a fraction of its tax revenues to service its debt, and debt will fall over time if the
interest factor 1 +  is not too high.
Assuming full depreciation, the law of motion of the public capital stock in in-
frastructure is given by8
+1 =   (12)
2.4 Market-Clearing and Equilibrium
Assuming full depreciation of private capital ( = 1), the market-clearing condition
requires private savings be equal to tomorrow’s stock of physical assets plus the stock
of government bonds:
+1 ++1 =  (13)
On the basis of these equations, the following definitions can be provided.
Definition 1: A competitive equilibrium in this economy is a sequence of prices
{  }∞=0, consumption and savings { +1 }∞=0, public and private capital stocks
{+1 +1}∞=0, government debt {+1}∞=0, a constant tax rate  and constant spend-
ing shares    , such that, given the initial capital stocks 0 and 0  0 and the
initial stock of public debt 0  0, individuals maximize utility, firms maximize profits,
and the product market clears.
8A more general specification would be to assume that the production of public capital requires
combining both the spending flow on productive goods and the existing stock of public capital, so
that +1 = ( )( )1−, with  ∈ (0 1). Our results would remain qualitatively similar. Note
also that we do not consider the issue of eﬃciency of public investment, which could be captured, as
in Agénor (2010) for instance, by multiplying  in (12) by a parameter that takes a value lower than
unity.
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Definition 2: A balanced growth equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium in which
, +1, , ,  ,  , and  all grow at the constant rate 1 +  and the rate
of return on private capital  and the interest rate on government bonds  are both
constant over time.
By implication, the public debt-private capital ratio and the public-private capital
ratio are both constant in equilibrium.
In what follows transfers to each individual are assumed to be given as a fraction
of unproductive spending per capita; thus,  =  ¯ , where  ∈ (0 1). Using this
assumption, and given the normalization ¯ = 1, it is straightforward to establish that
in equilibrium savings are given by
 = [(1− ) + ] (14)
where  = 1(2 + )  1 is the individual, before-tax savings rate.9 Thus, given the
log-linear utility function used in (1), the savings rate does not depend on the rental
rate of capital, +1.
Assuming that physical and financial assets are perfect substitutes implies the no
arbitrage condition 1+  = 1+ . Thus, using (6) and (8), and given full depreciation
of private capital,
1 +  = (1− ) = (1− )(
 ) (15)
Changes in the interest rate on government bonds are therefore endogenously related
to changes in the public-private capital ratio, thereby creating interdependence between
the dynamics of public debt and capital accumulation.
3 Dynamics and Fiscal Rules
We begin by deriving the dynamics of the debt-private capital ratio and the growth
rate of output. Sustainability of fiscal policy is defined in the process, in relation to
the existence of a balanced growth equilibrium. We then consider three alternative
fiscal rules (a primary balance rule, a primary surplus rule, and a golden rule) and
9From (4),  =  , and from (6) and (10),  =  = . Substituting this result
in (4) and using again (6) yields  + +1(1 + +1) = [(1− ) + ]. In standard fashion, the
optimization problem yields the Euler equation +1 = 1 + +1(1 + ), which can be substituted
in the consolidated budget constraint to give  = [(1+ )(2+ )][(1− )+ ]. Using (2) and
the expression for  derived earlier yields equation (14).
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examine the conditions under which multiple equilibria, all characterized by a positive
and constant public debt-private capital ratio, may emerge.
3.1 Debt and Growth Dynamics
To analyze the dynamics of the economy, begin by substituting (10) in (12) and use
(6) to give
+1 =  (16)
Substituting (6), (11) and (14) in (13) yields
+1 = Λ1 − (1 + ) (17)
where
Λ1 = {[(1− ) + ] + [1− ( + )]} (18)
is the aggregate, after-tax savings rate, whose sign depends on the fiscal rule in place.
Using (8) and (15), and with  =  defined as the public debt-private capital
ratio, equation (17) can be written as
+1
 = (
 )[Λ1 − (1− )] (19)
Similarly, from (8) and (16),
+1
 = (

 ) = (
 )−1 (20)
Dividing (20) by (19) gives
+1 = Λ1 − (1− )  (21)
Equation (21) determines the dynamics of the public-private capital ratio as a
function solely of the debt-private capital ratio.10 For it to yield a positive value of 
in a steady state with positive debt, the following necessary (although not suﬃcient)
restriction is imposed:
10It can easily be established that, if as noted earlier public capital accumulation is specificed as
+1 = ( )( )1−, with  ∈ (0 1) instead of (12), +1 in (21) would also depend on  . However,
the system would remain recursive.
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Assumption 2: Λ1  0.
Because Λ1 depends on how government spending is allocated, whether Assumption
2 is automatically satisfied or not depends on the nature of the fiscal rule. As can be
inferred from (18), with a primary balance rule or a primary surplus rule, Λ1 is always
positive. With a golden rule, however, this is not necessarily the case, as shown later.
Now, to determine the dynamics of public debt, note that equation (11) can be
written as, using (6),
+1
 = 1 +  − [1− ( + )] (

 )(

 )
that is, using (8) and (15),
+1
 = [(1− )− Λ2
−1 ]( ) (22)
where
Λ2 = [1− ( + )] (23)
Dividing (22) by (19) gives
+1 = (1− ) − Λ2Λ1 − (1− ) =  () (24)
from which it can be established that
 0 = (1− )(Λ1 − Λ2)
[Λ1 − (1− )˜]2  
00 =
2(1− ) 0
Λ1 − (1− )˜ 
where ˜ is the steady-state value of the debt-to-private capital ratio.
From the definitions of Λ1 and Λ2 in (18) and (23), it can be established that Λ1−
Λ2  0. Thus,  0  0. Given Assumption 2, to ensure that the public-private capital
ratio is positive requires that the debt-private capital ratio be less than Λ1(1− ). If
so then  00 is also positive, which implies that the transition curve  () is convex, as
illustrated in Figure 1.11
The model consists therefore of (21) and (24). It is recursive: equation (24) deter-
mines the evolution of , which can be substituted in (21) to determine the evolution
11The figure assumes that −Λ2Λ1  0, which turns out to be the case for some of the fiscal rules
considered later. Note that the transition curve becomes steeper as −Λ2Λ1 rises.
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of  . The fundamental reason for this property, as can be inferred from (8), (19), and
(22), is that both the private capital stock and the stock of public debt are linear in
the output-capital ratio. In addition, because the term ( ) drops out when solving
for the reduce form of the system, the parameter  has no eﬀect on the dynamics of 
and  .
We can now provide a definition of fiscal sustainability.12
Definition 3: A fiscal policy rule defined by a vector (     ) of budgetary
parameters is sustainable if, for given structural parameters (  ) and an initial
value 0  0, it is associated with a balanced growth equilibrium with ˜  0.
Put diﬀerently, and by implication of Definition 2, a fiscal policy rule is sustainable
if a balanced growth path exists, because in that case the debt-private capital ratio
(given an initial level 0) always converges to some positive, finite level in the long
run.13 Note that this definition does not exclude the possibility of multiple equilibrium
growth paths.
Now, the economy’s balanced growth path is given by14
1 + +1 = +1 = ()
[Λ1 − (1− )]1− (25)
which implies a negative relationship between the debt-private capital ratio and the
growth rate of output. On the one hand, an increase in  raises the public-private
capital ratio, which tends to promote growth; on the other, it lowers the rate of private
capital accumulation, which tends to hamper growth. Given our parameter assump-
tions (namely,   1), and the linearity of the aggregate production function in the
private capital stock, the crowding-out eﬀect dominates the crowding-in eﬀect and the
net impact on growth of higher debt is (all things equal, specifically for  given) always
negative.
12In the standard definition of fiscal (or debt) sustainability, a fiscal policy is said to be sustainable
if the present value of future primary surpluses equals the current level of debt (see, for instance,
Collignon (2012)). Put diﬀerently, the budget must be balanced in present value terms to rule out
Ponzi games. The definition provided here is broader and in line with the recent analytical literature;
see for instance, Yakita (2008). Moreover, in a model as simple as the one considered here (with, in
particular, log-linear utility), it encompasses the no-Ponzi game condition.
13In general, ˜ can be either positive or negative. However, from an economic point of view a
positive value of government debt is more realistic.
14To determine this result, first write equation (8) for  + 1, so that +1 = (+1)+1, or
equivalently, using (17), +1 = (+1)[Λ1− (1+ )]. Substituting (15) in this expression yields+1 = (+1)[Λ1 − (1− )]. Substituting (21) in this expression yields (25).
13
Setting +1 =  in (24) implies that the steady-state debt-private capital ratio is
the solution of the quadratic equation
(1− )˜2 − [Λ1 − (1− )]˜− Λ2 = 0 (26)
where Λ1 − (1− ) ≶ 0 in general. From (21), the steady-state public-private capital
ratio is given by
˜ = Λ1 − (1− )˜  (27)
which again describes a convex relationship between ˜ and ˜. Similarly, from (25) the
equilibrium growth rate of output is
1 +  = ()[Λ1 − (1− )˜]1− (28)
Depending on the values of Λ1 and Λ2, the model may exhibit no equilibrium, a
single equilibrium, or two equilibria. And given that both Λ1 and Λ2 depend on the
fiscal policy rule, we need now to consider alternative specifications of these rules.
3.2 Alternative Fiscal Rules
3.2.1 Primary Balance Rule
With a primary balance rule, + = 1; from (18) and (23), Λ1 = [(1−)+] 
0 and Λ2 = 0. Thus, Assumption 2 is automatically satisfied. Ignoring the trivial
solution ˜ = 0, equation (26) boils down to15
˜ = Λ1 − (1− )
1−  =
Λ1
1−  − 1 (29)
which is positive as long as Λ1− (1−)  0. In turn, this condition requires (1− )+
  (1− ), or equivalently, with  = 1−  ,
  
¯¯
+=1 = 1 + ()−1
½
1−  − 1− 
¾
 (30)
With ˜ given by (29), equations (27) and (28) imply that the public-private capital
ratio and the growth rate are given by ˜ = (1−), and 1+ = ()(1−)1−,
15With a primary balance rule, and given that Λ2 = 0, the origin of the transition curve is at 0 in
Figure 1.
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which are always positive. From (15), 1 + ˜ = 1 + , or equivalently the rate of return
to capital must be equal to the growth rate of output to ensure that the debt-private
capital (or, equivalently, the debt-output) ratio does not explode. These results can be
summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. With a primary balance rule, and positive transfers to households,
a steady-state equilibrium with positive debt, a positive public-private capital ratio, and
positive growth exists if the share of government spending allocated to investment is not
too large.
Intuitively, with a primary balance rule, interest payments alone drive the growth
in public debt. However, the no-arbitrage condition implies a positive relationship
between the interest rate on government bonds and the public-private capital ratio; if
that ratio grows too fast, because the fraction of resources allocated to investment in
infrastructure is too high, public debt will grow too fast compared to private capital
and output. Convergence cannot be achieved.
To get a practical sense of the conditions under which (30) holds, consider the
following calibration (see Table 1 for a summary). In line with standard empirical esti-
mates of the labor elasticity of output, the value of  is set at 07. Fernández-Huertas
and Vidal (2010) for instance use the same value. Studies such as Turnovsky (2004)
and Annichiarico and Giammarioli (2008) for instance use a value of 025 for the tax
rate; here, to account for the fact that only labor is taxed in the model, we divide this
rate by the labor share. Thus,  = 02507 = 036. To estimate the savings rate, as
defined in the model, we adjust the actual data to account for the proportion of un-
employed households and indirect savings through pension contributions by employed
workers and employer contributions; using OECD data for major industrial countries
(available at http://stats.oecd.org/), this gives an estimate of  = 056. Based on
OECD data for the cash benefits component of social expenditure, government trans-
fers to households can be estimated at 124 percent of GDP in 2013 for the same group
of countries, whereas Inderst (2013) estimates that the share of public investment in
infrastructure for industrial countries was about 13 percent of GDP in recent years.
From (6),  =  , whereas from (10),  = ; thus, the actual  can be esti-
mated as  = ( ) = 0013025 = 52 percent. Moreover, from (10), under
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a primary balance rule we also have  = (1 − ); this gives therefore the share
of unproductive spending (or, more precisely here, spending other than infrastructure
investment) in total revenues as  = 0948. By implication, the share of transfers
in total unproductive spending can be estimated as  = 0124(025 · 0948) = 052.
Using the calibrated values of  , ,  and , the value implied by the right-hand side
of (30) is 034, which implies indeed that   
¯¯
+=1.
3.2.2 Primary Surplus Rule
With a primary surplus rule,  +   1, and from (18), (23) and Assumption 1,
Λ1Λ2  0. In fact, regardless of the sign of Λ1 − (1 − ), equation (26) yields one
positive and one negative solution for ˜.16 There are no multiple equilibria in that case.
Moreover, it can be verified that the admissible equilibrium is always unstable. In terms
of Figure 1, this can be illustrated by noting that, as before,  0  00  0. In addition,
with Λ1Λ2  0,  (0) = −Λ2Λ1  0. Thus, the transition curve  () intersects the
45-degree line only once, from below. Intuitively, if the initial value of debt is lower
than the (unique) equilibrium value, the policy rule drives that debt to zero in finite
time. Conversely, if public debt is initially higher than its equilibrium value, the policy
is unable to tame the unstable dynamics associated with interest payments; as a result,
the debt-public capital ratio grows without bounds.
3.2.3 Golden Rule
With an (interest-inclusive) golden rule,  = 1, all public investment and interest
payments are financed by borrowing, and Λ1 = {[(1 − ) + ] − } ≷ 0, Λ2 =
−  0.17 18 However, the nature of the equilibria depends on the sign of Λ1−(1−).
16This is a direct implication of Descartes’ rule of signs, according to which the number of positive
real roots of a polynomial is bounded by the number of changes in sign of the sequence of its coeﬃcients.
The discriminant of (26) is ∆ = [Λ1 − (1 − )]2 + 4(1 − )Λ2, which is always positive. Because√∆  Λ1 − (1− ), the positive solution is [Λ1 − (1− ) +√∆]2(1− ).
17Note that in that case, as implied by (10), investment spending is still defined in terms of a
fraction of tax revenues. As a share of output, government investment is simply  .
18We consider an interest-inclusive golden rule in the benchmark case on the ground that if invest-
ment today is going to benefit future generations, then the whole burden of repaying the debt, which
includes interest payments, should be borne by future generations as well. In the next section a more
general rule, which considers only partial bond financing of interest payments, is considered.
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If Λ1− (1−)  0 (a necessary condition for which is Λ1  0, as noted in Assumption
2), equation (26) can yield zero, one, or two positive solutions for ˜. In contrast, with
Λ1 − (1 − )  0, there are no positive solutions to (26).19 Intuitively, in that case
even if the aggregate savings rate is positive (Λ1  0), it is not large enough to ensure
positive private capital accumulation because the fraction of the economy’s savings
claimed by the government (through the accumulation of public debt) is too high.
The condition for Λ1 − (1 − )  0 is now [(1 − ) + ] −   (1 − ), or
equivalently
  
¯¯1
=1 = −1
½
[(1− ) + ]− 1− 
¾

Using the values provided earlier for  , ,  and  yields 
¯¯1
=1 = 01, which
implies indeed that   
¯¯1
=1. However, this restriction on  is necessary, but
not suﬃcient, to generate multiple equilibria. To do so there is a second critical value
of  below which multiple equilibria can emerge, determined by Λ1 = (1 − ) +
2
p−Λ2(1− ), or equivalently
{[(1− ) + ]− } − (1− )− 2
p(1− ) = 0 (31)
This expression cannot be solved analytically for  . Let 
¯¯2
=1 denote the thresh-
old value of  implied by (31); then it must be that 
¯¯2
=1  
¯¯1
=1. This is proved
in a simple manner in Figure 2. Let () = {[(1− ) + ] − }; it is linear in
 , with a negative slope 0 = −. Let also () = (1 − ) + 2p(1− ); it is
an increasing, concave function of  , with (0) = 1 − . The critical value 
¯¯1
=1
is determined at the intersection of () with the line 1− , at Point , whereas the
critical value 
¯¯2
=1 is determined at the intersection of () and (), at Point
.20
For  ∈ (
¯¯2
=1  
¯¯1
=1) there is no admissible equilibrium (consistent with
Definitions 1-3), whereas for  = 
¯¯2
=1 there is a single equilibrium. In Figure
19More precisely, the existence and the number of equilibria depends on the sign of ∆ = [Λ1 − (1−
)]2+4(1−)Λ2, which (given that Λ2  0) is in general ambiguous. If ∆  0, there are two positive
values of ˜ that will satisfy (26), whereas with ∆ = 0, the equilibrium is unique. With ∆  0, there is
no equilibrium with real values. After some manipulations, the necessary condition for the existence
of multiple equilibria can be expressed as Λ1  (1 − ) + 2[−Λ2(1 − )]05. With Λ1 − (1 − )  0,
this condition cannot be fulfilled.
20Figure 2 assumes that (0) = [(1 − ) + ]  1 − . This condition is satisfied for a large
range of reasonable values for the underlying parameters.
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1, this corresponds to the point at which the transition curve  () is tangent to the
45-degree line, at Point ; in Figure 2, this corresponds to Point , where () and
() intersect. For   
¯¯2
=1 there are multiple equilibria.
21
These results can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 2. With a golden rule, and given that 
¯¯2
=1  
¯¯1
=1, there are
no equilibria with a non-negative steady-state value of the public debt-private capital
ratio if  ∈ (
¯¯2
=1  
¯¯1
=1), a single equilibrium if  = 
¯¯2
=1, and multiple
equilibria if   
¯¯2
=1.
In Figure 2 we also compare the threshold levels of the investment share under the
primary balance and the golden rules. From the condition used to establish (30), let
() = [(1 − ) + (1 − )]. This function is also linear in  , with a slope
0 = −  0 and (0) = (0). The threshold value 
¯¯
+=1 is obtained at the
intersection of () and the line 1 − , as shown at point  in the figure. Because
|0|  |0|, the figure also shows (quite intuitively) that the threshold value of the
investment share for an equilibrium with a positive steady-state solution of the debt-
private capital ratio is unambiguously higher with a primary balance rule.
The possibility of multiple (nontrivial) equilibria in the case of the golden rule under
the condition Λ1 − (1 − )  0, is illustrated in Figure 1. If  is too high (that is,
  
¯¯2
=1), the transition curve  () is located entirely above the 45-degree line
and there is no equilibrium. Put diﬀerently, if the golden rule calls for investing a
fraction  of output that is too large, the economy cannot reach a steady state: debt
grows faster than the stock of public capital, and this implies that the debt-private
capital ratio explodes. An overambitious, debt-financed program of public capital
accumulation is not sustainable.
The figure also shows that there is a single equilibrium at Point, and two equilibria
at Points  and 0. Inspection of these equilibria, together with (27) and (28), yields
the following result.
Proposition 3. When multiple steady-state equilibria exist, the equilibrium with
the smaller (larger) public debt-private capital ratio is stable (unstable) and is associated
21A general borrowing “rule,” in which the government borrows to finance either higher investment
or unproductive spending, could also be defined by setting  +   1. However, it is easy to verify
that the nature of the solution to the model (namely, the conditions for generating multiple equilibria,
this time in terms of  +  ) is qualitatively similar to what is obtained under the golden rule.
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with a lower (larger) public-private capital ratio and a higher (lower) growth rate of
output.
The negative relationship between the debt-private capital ratio and the growth
rate of output, which can be directly inferred from (28), results from the fact that the
crowding-out eﬀect of public debt always dominates the productivity eﬀect of public
capital.22 By implication of Proposition 3, the economy can attain the high steady state
only if it starts there. If the initial debt-private capital ratio is at 10 for instance, or
at any point located below  (corresponding to Point 0), the economy will converge
over time toward the low-debt, high-growth equilibrium , which is characterized by
equality between the growth rates of both capital stocks, output, and public debt.
In contrast, if the economy starts at any point located above  , such as 20, it will
move over time away from the high-debt, low-growth equilibrium. The growth in
public debt always exceeds the growth in the private capital stock, implying that their
ratio increases continuously. In that sense, the fiscal policy is unsustainable; public
investment must be cut suﬃciently to ensure that the transition curve shifts down,
in such a way that it intersects the 45-degree line to the right of point ; if so, the
economy will begin to converge toward the low-debt, high-growth equilibrium. Put
diﬀerently, if the initial debt is not too high (below ), the existing fiscal policy is
sustainable, and movements along the transition curve will lead to a low-debt steady
state; if the initial debt is too high (above ), a policy change, involving a downward
shift in the transition curve, is required to make the fiscal stance sustainable.23 The
22In turn, as noted earlier, this is due to the linearity of the production function (8) with respect
to private capital and the fact that   1. If there is crowding out, the eﬀect of the reduction in the
private capital stock always dominates the eﬀect of an increase in the public capital stock–despite
the fact that the former magnifies the increase in the public-private capital ratio.
23Note that with the general borrowing “rule” referred to earlier, according to which the government
issues debt to finance both investment and unproductive spending ( +   1), the adjustment
needed to ensure sustainability could involve cuts only in the latter component. However, if the
initial debt ratio is well above  , cuts in both types of outlays may be inevitable. Alternatively,
the initial debt level could be cut instantly to a level below  either through debt cancellation,
debt writedown, or unilateral default (assuming that the latter does not incur significant costs). In
fact, if the incompressible level of public expenditure related to both current spending (on schools,
the police, and courts for instance) and capital investment is high, a combination of expenditure
reduction and debt cancelation may well be necessary to ensure that the fiscal adjustment is large
enough to guarantee that the initial position of the economy puts it on a convergent path toward
the high-growth, low-debt equilibrium. These results may be a good illustration of Greece’s recent
predicament.
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value  is therefore the maximum initial debt-private capital ratio consistent with
sustainability.
Another way to illustrate the possibility of multiple equilibrium values in the public
debt-private capital ratio under the golden rule is as follows. Defining (˜) = (1−)˜2
and (˜ ) = [Λ1 − (1− )]˜+ Λ2, equation (26) can be rewritten as
(˜) = (˜ )
with 0  0, ˜ ≷ 0 if Λ1 − (1− ) ≷ 0, and   0.
Function (˜) is a parabola with a minimum at ˜ = 0, whereas function (˜ ) is
linear in ˜ and has an ambiguous slope; it also intersects the horizontal axis at a positive
value of ˜, as long as  is strictly positive. Both curves are shown in Figure 3 and
alternative outcomes illustrated. It is immediately obvious that if Λ1 − (1− )  0–
a condition that is more likely to occur if  is high–there cannot be an equilibrium
where (˜) = (˜ ). If Λ1−(1−)  0, (˜ ) is positively sloped and all three cases
illustrated in Figure 1 may occur; there may be no equilibrium, a single equilibrium
(Point ), or two equilibria (Points  and 0). For two (nontrivial) equilibria to
emerge,  must be smaller than the value that it takes at Point , to ensure that Λ1 =
(1−)−Λ2 is larger and (˜ ) steeper. Thus, (˜ ) rotates counterclockwise and
shifts up at the same time. By implication, there can be neither a single equilibrium
nor multiple equilibria if the investment program calls for a value of  that is too high,
because a higher value of  shifts (˜ ) downward and makes it flatter, whereas it
has no eﬀect on (˜).
Thus, the results with a golden rule are consistent with those obtained in studies
that analyze the dynamics of public debt in endogenous growth models without public
capital (such as Futagami and Shibata (2003) and Brauninger (2005)) and with public
capital (such as Futagami et al. (2008) and Yakita (2008)): the low-debt steady state
is characterized by high growth, and conversely for the high-debt equilibrium. Even
though in the present setting government debt has a crowding-in eﬀect as well, it
is not large enough to oﬀset the crowding-out eﬀect on private savings and capital
accumulation.
However, even though the growth rate of output and the public debt-private capital
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ratio are inversely related–not only in the steady state, but during the transition as
well, as implied by (25)–public debt itself is endogenous. As a result, an increase in
the share of investment  , in particular, has in general an ambiguous eﬀect on growth.
On the one hand, it raises the debt-private capital ratio, which tends to lower growth.
On the other, it raises the public-private capital ratio, both directly and indirectly, as
implied by (27). By implication, as can be inferred from (28), the steady-state growth
rate of output may increase following a rise in  if , the elasticity of output with
respect to public capital, is suﬃciently high.
This result can be illustrated graphically by extending Figure 1 to represent the
downward-sloping curve linking 1 + +1 and  (equation (25)) in an additional quad-
rant, as in Figure 4. This curve, referred to as Ξ() in the lower panel of the figure, has
a concave shape. Suppose that the initial position of the economy is at Point .24 An
increase in  shifts the transition curve for  (which does not depend on ) upward in
the upper quadrant, and raises the low steady-state value of that variable, from  to
. Curve Ξ() shifts upward in the lower quadrant, so initially growth unambiguously
increases; however, as  starts increasing towards its new, higher equilibrium value,
the crowding-out eﬀect creates a downward movement along Ξ(); the growth rate
begins falling. Whether the end result is a higher or lower steady-state growth rate
cannot be ascertained a priori and depends on . If  is high, the economy will move
from 0 to 00 where the growth rate is higher than initially. In contrast, if  is low,
the economy may end up at 000, where growth is lower than at Point .25
This analysis brings out another important point. Inspection of the threshold values
of the investment share under the primary balance and golden rules shows that neither
one of these values depends on . This diﬀers from most contributions in the literature
based on representative agent and OLG models, such as Futagami et al. (2008), Yakita
(2008), Arai (2011), Greiner (2012), and Minea and Villieu (2012), where that elasticity
is set equal, in standard Barro (1990) fashion, to the labor elasticity of output. Put
24If the economy is initially at 0 (the high-debt equilibrium), it cannot converge to a new equilib-
rium, given the movement of the transition curve in this experiment.
25Of course, if the increase in  is financed by a cut in unproductive spending (such that + =
0), the adverse eﬀect on the debt-private capital ratio vanishes and the increase in  would have an
unambiguously positive eﬀect on growth. However, as long as public borrowing is used, at least in
part, to finance investment the ambiguity highlighted in the foregoing discussion will continue to hold.
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diﬀerently, the magnitude of the elasticity of output with respect to public capital
plays no role in whether multiple equilibria may emerge (it does not aﬀect the slope of
the transition curve), and, as long as it is less than unity, in whether the growth rate
of output and the debt-private capital ratio are positively or negatively related in the
steady state.26 However, as the above experiment illustrates, it matters significantly
when it comes to assessing the long-run eﬀects on economic growth of a change in
investment spending on infrastructure.27
4 Extensions
We now consider several extensions of the basic framework: partial depreciation of
public and private capital, an endogenous risk premium on government debt, an en-
dogenous primary surplus rule, a more general golden rule (in which only a fraction
of public investment and interest payments are financed by debt accumulation), and
network externalities associated with public capital in the production technology.28
4.1 Partial Depreciation
Under partial depreciation of private and public capital, equations (12) and (13) are
replaced by
+1 =  + (1− )  (32)
+1 ++1 =  + (1−  )  (33)
where    ∈ (0 1). For simplicity, the no-arbitrage condition is now specified as
 =  +  ; thus, from (6), equation (15) continues to hold.
26As can be inferred from (8), in the particular case where  = 1 for instance,  =  and the
crowding-out eﬀect of public debt disappears; in that case, the debt-private capital ratio and output
growth are positively related. The same result would hold with   1. As noted earlier, much of the
(linear) empirical evidence suggests that   1–except for the case of network externalities, which is
discussed later.
27Teles and Mussolini (2014) also find that it is possible for an increase in productive government
spending to raise the steady-state values of both the growth rate and the debt-to-output ratio–even
though they also assume that that elasticity of output with respect to public capital is equal to the
labor elasticity of output. However, as a result, the role of that elasticity cannot be clearly identified.
28In Appendix 1 we consider another extension, a nonseparable utility function. However, because
explicit analytical solutions cannot be derived in that case, only an intuitive discussion is provided.
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The equation that determines the dynamics of the level of public debt, (22), remains
the same. As shown in Appendix 1, The dynamic system in  and  is now given by
+1 =  + (1− 
)( )1−
Λ1 − (1− ) + (1−  )( )−  (34)
+1 = (1− ) − Λ2Λ1 − (1− ) + (1−  )( )−  (35)
Thus, the system is no longer recursive; this is mainly because the public and private
capital stocks are no longer linear in the output-private capital ratio. The evolution
of  and  must be determined jointly. Equations (34) and (35) represent a highly
nonlinear system, whose steady-state solution is given in Appendix 1. As also shown
there, depending not only on how low  and  are (compared to the benchmark case
of  =  = 1), but also on the sign of − , more than two equilibria may emerge.
To characterize these equilibria a numerical analysis is needed.
In the particular case where only private capital depreciates fully in one period
( = 1,   1), equations (34) and (35) become
+1 =  + (1− 
)( )1−
Λ1 − (1− )  (36)
+1 =  () (37)
where  () is defined in (24). Thus, with partial depreciation of public capital only, the
system remains recursive, and the transition curve for  continues to be independent
of . As before, multiple equilibria can emerge. However, the dynamics of  and 
are no longer independent of ; and the steady-state growth rate of output, now equal
to,
1 +  = [ + (1− )(˜)1−][Λ1 − (1− )˜]1− (38)
may no longer be negatively related with public debt. In contrast to the case where
 = 1, an increase in the debt-private capital ratio does not necessarily raise the
public-private capital ratio; this can be verified, as shown in Appendix 1, by applying
the implicit function theorem to the steady-state solution of (36). But if it does,
the growth-promoting eﬀect of higher debt may be magnified, given the extra term
(1−)(˜)1− in (38). And this eﬀect may be large enough to dominate the crowding-
out eﬀect on the rate of private capital accumulation. Thus, even with   1 and
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production being linear in the private capital stock, the net impact on growth of higher
debt is now ambiguous. In particular, the steady-state growth rate of output may
now be positively related to the debt-private capital ratio. This result may be useful
to understand why some empirical studies have found it diﬃcult to detect a robust
negative relationship between public debt and growth (see for instance Panizza and
Presbitero (2014)) and Teles and Mussolini (2014)).
4.2 Endogenous Risk Premium
In practice, the interest rate on public debt often includes a premium that increases
with net liabilities due to the higher (perceived) default risk by the government.29
Suppose now that there is indeed an endogenous risk of default, with a repayment
probability  ≤ 1. If the government defaults, a bond holder receives no income.
Thus, the no arbitrage condition is now (1 + ) + 0 · (1− ) = 1+ , or equivalently
1 +  = 1 +   (39)
where −1 can equivalently be defined as the risk premium.
Suppose also that the repayment probability is decreasing in the debt-private capital
ratio:
 = ()
where 0  0 and 00  0, and lim→0  = 1. Thus, the higher the debt-private capital
ratio, the higher the risk premium demanded by markets for holding government debt.
To fix ideas, we will assume that  = − , where  ≥ 1.
Using (39), it can be shown that (21), (24) and (25) are now replaced by
+1 = Λ1 − (1− )1+  (40)
+1 =  () = (1− )
1+ − Λ2
Λ1 − (1− )1+  (41)
1 + +1 = ()[Λ1 − (1− )1+ ]1− (42)
29See Bi (2012) and the references therein for empirical evidence.
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As before, the system is recursive in , and equation (41) can be solved for a
given value of . Now, consider the golden rule, for which Λ2  0, and assume that
the necessary condition Λ1  0 for ˜  0 holds. The following result can then be
established:
Proposition 4. Under the golden rule, the higher the sensitivity of the risk pre-
mium to the debt-private capital ratio, the more likely it is that multiple equilibria will
emerge if the steady-state value of that ratio is less than unity, and the more likely that
no equilibrium will exist if that ratio is higher than unity.
In order to see this, note first that the transition curve  () is again an increasing,
convex function of , just like in Figure 1. Equilibrium occurs when  () intersects the
45-degree line. For ˜  1, an increase in  reduces (1− )˜1+, which in turn reduces
 (˜) and shifts the transition curve down, therefore making the possibility of multiple
equilibria more likely. In contrast, for ˜  1 (the case of highly-indebted countries),
there may be no equilibria, as a higher  shifts the transition curve upward.
It can be observed that, in the particular case where  = 1, equation (41) yields a
cubic equation in ˜:
(1− )˜3 + (1− )˜2 − Λ1˜− Λ2 = 0
With Λ1  0 and Λ2  0, this equation has at most two admissible (that is, positive)
solutions, as in the basic framework.30 However, the threshold value of the investment
share cannot be derived analytically. From (42), it can also be seen that, regardless of
the value of , the negative relationship between ˜ and the growth rate continues to
hold.31
The thrust of this analysis therefore is that when markets demand a premium that
responds endogenously to a country’s debt level (or, in practice, perceptions about
future debt levels), the possibility for that country to be stuck in a high-debt, low-
growth equilibrium becomes more likely. From the perspective of a country like Greece
30This, again, is a direct implication of Descartes’ rule of signs.
31It could be assumed alternatively that the risk premium is a function of the debt-public capital
ratio (an indicator of the government’s net worth) or the debt-output ratio (a common market indicator
in practice). It can be verified that in either case the dynamic system is no longer recursive. For
instance, with  = ( )−, where  ≥ 1, the transition function for +1 is [(1− )( )−1+ −Λ2][Λ1 − (1 − )( )−1+ ], which depends on both  and  . A similar equation holds for +1.
The properties of this system must be studied numerically.
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today, where (at the time of this writing) spreads on the country’s sovereign debt have
risen sharply due to concerns about debt sustainability, market discipline can actually
complicate macroeconomic management.
4.3 Endogenous Primary Surplus Rule
In the foregoing discussion, the primary surplus rule that was considered assumed
simply that the shares of spending sum up to a value lower than unity. Suppose instead
that the rule involves a positive (and linear, for simplicity) relationship between the
primary surplus and the debt ratio:
1− ( + ) =  (43)
where   0. This relationship, of course, holds only for  +   1. Using this
specification, it can readily be established that the following dynamic system obtains:
+1 = Θ2Θ1 −Θ2  
+1 =

Θ1 −Θ2 
where Θ1 =  [(1− ) + ]  0 and Θ2 = (1 − ) −  ≶ 0. As before, the
system is recursive. The steady-state solution yields
˜ = Θ1Θ2 − 1, ˜
 =

Θ2 
For these solutions to be admissible, the coeﬃcient  must be small enough to
ensure that 0  Θ2 ≤ Θ1. Once again there are no multiple equilibria. However,
the key diﬀerence with the exogenous primary surplus rule is that now the trivial
equilibrium ˜ = 0 is admissible; if the economy starts from a position with no debt
(0 = 0), it will stay there. Any other equilibrium point with positive debt is feasible
but also unstable.32
4.4 Generalized Golden Rule
Consider now a flexible golden rule that involves financing a fraction  ∈ (0 1) of public
investment, and a fraction  ∈ (0 1) of interest payments, through bond financing. The
32As for the risk premium case considered earlier, the primary surplus rule in (43) could be specified
in terms of the debt-output ratio or the debt-public capital ratio. In either case the system would no
longer be recursive, but a single equilibrium would emerge once again for a wide range of plausible
parameter values. These results are available upon request.
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government flow budget constraint and the debt accumulation equation take now the
form
 + (1− ) + (1− )(1 + ) =  (44)
+1 = (1 + ) +   (45)
A fiscal policy rule therefore involves setting two additional parameters,  and .
To ensure that (44) holds, one of the terms on the left-hand side must now be
determined endogenously. We assume that it is  , or more precisely the share of
unproductive spending. Using (6), (8) (10), and (15) yields
 = 1− (1− ) − ()−1(1− )(1− ) (46)
which implies a negative relationship between the debt-private capital ratio and the
share of spending on unproductive services. There is therefore a negative feedback
eﬀect of debt on government outlays.33 Because transfers to households are a fraction
of unproductive spending, individual savings are given again by (14), but with 
defined as in (46). Thus, through its adverse impact on private savings, public debt
accumulation has a direct crowding-out eﬀect on private capital formation.34 If  
0, the transfer is actually a tax on households.
Using the same solution procedure as before, it can be shown that
+1 = Λ5 − Λ6 
where
Λ3 = 1− (1− )  0
Λ4 = ()−1(1− )(1− )  0
Λ5 = {[(1− ) + Λ3]− }
33This rule is similar in spirit to the one considered by Greiner (2007) for instance, where the ratio
of the primary surplus to gross domestic income is a positive, linear function of the debt-to-income
ratio. This ensures that public debt is sustainable. The reasoning behind this argument is that if a
government raises the primary surplus as public debt increases, it takes corrective actions that will
eventually stabilize the debt ratio. However, in Greiner’s analysis, it is public investment that is
determined residually.
34Note that this feedback eﬀect on private savings is related to the fact that we assumed that
transfers to households are a fixed fraction of unproductive spending. If  instead had been modeled
directly as a fraction of revenues, debt would have no direct eﬀect on private savings.
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Λ6 = Λ4+ (1− )  0
The golden rule is no longer defined as  = 1, as long as  or  is less than unity
(see (46)); it now also depends on the specified values of these two parameters.35 It is
easy to show that, under that rule,
+1 = (1− ) + Λ5 − Λ6 
The basic framework of course corresponds to  =  = 1, whereas the conventional
(interest exclusive) definition of the golden rule corresponds to  = 0 and  = 1. The
important point, however, is that with  and  positive and less than unity, the shape
of the transition curve is not aﬀected; it retains a convex shape. Thus, the qualitative
predictions of our benchmark model remain the same.36
The equilibrium is now the solution to the quadratic equation
Λ6˜2 − [Λ5 − (1− )]˜−  = 0 (47)
As before, the nature of the equilibria depends on the sign of Λ5 − (1− ). With
Λ5 − (1 − )  0, there are no positive solutions to (47). With Λ5 − (1 − )  0,
equation (47) can yield zero, one, or two positive solutions for ˜. The condition for
Λ5 − (1− )  0 is now
  
¯¯1
 = [ + (1− )]−1
½
[(1− ) + ]− (1− )
¾

Again,   
¯¯1
 is a necessary condition for (47) to have an admissible solution,
but it is not suﬃcient. In order to rule out the possibility of negative values for ˜, a
second condition is needed, which can be expressed as [Λ5−(1−)]2−4Λ6  0
or, equivalently, Λ5 − (1 − )  2√Λ6. Just as in the benchmark model, an
analytical solution cannot be provided.
To illustrate the implications of having both  and  less than unity we report
some numerical results in Figures 5 and 6, for the values defined earlier for ,  , ,
and  (07, 036, 056, and 052, respectively). The critical values for  in the figures
35This implies also that Definition 3 should be adjusted accordingly.
36A primary balance rule for instance is now defined as (1 − ) +  = 1; for (46) to hold
continuously,  must be equal to unity, as before.
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yield a single equilibrium for the system, as well as being the threshold values for the
existence of equilibrium. Above these critical values, there is no equilibrium whereas
below these values, there are multiple equilibria. Figure 5 displays the critical values for
 on the vertical axis, which are by definition between zero and one, where  = 052
(as calibrated earlier),  and  are shown on the -axis and -axis, respectively, and
they vary between 01 and 05. For the parameters given above, there is no positive
value of  that yields an equilibrium beyond the values of 05 for  and , therefore
these cases are omitted. The figures clearly show that as  and  increase, which means
less (more) of interest payments or infrastructure spending are being financed by tax
revenues (borrowing), the government can spend less (more) on infrastructure as a
fraction of tax revenues, and hence the critical value for  falls. Moreover, the critical
values for  are more sensitive to changes in  than , as can be seen from the figure.
At really low values of  and  (when a very large fraction of interest payments and
infrastructure spending are financed by tax revenues), the condition is not binding, as
the critical value for  exceeds one in that case–and is therefore not feasible.
In Figure 6,  is set at 025 (a reasonable value for the share of interest payments
financed through through bond issuance), and  and  are varied again between 01
and 05 in order to analyze the eﬀect of the share of transfers in unproductive spending
on the critical value of  . As before,  is shown on the -axis whereas  is on the -axis
this time. The figure shows that an increase in the share of transfers in unproductive
government spending reduces the critical value of  as well. However, this eﬀect is
much smaller than an increase in , as can be seen by comparing the two figures.
Note also that, again, the earlier result of a negative steady-state relationship be-
tween the debt ratio and the growth rate continues to hold, regardless of the values of
,  and .
4.5 Network Externalities
Suppose now that public capital is subject to network externalities, which induce
nonlinearities in its productivity. In general, the productivity gain of additional in-
frastructure investment is a combination of two distinct eﬀects. On the one hand, a
new network user unequivocally increases the value of the network: she gains from
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being connected to the other network members, while the latter have a (small) gain
from being connected to her. On the other, as documented in the diﬀusion literature,
the user base of a network increases in a nonlinear (logistic) fashion in investment
(see Rogers (2003)). Here we focus on the case where the combination of these eﬀects
generates a convex form of the network externalities.
Specifically, we assume that until the network is built, public capital has a relatively
low (and constant) marginal productivity. Once the basic parts of a network are
established, and a critical mass has been reached (say, ), strong gains are associated
with small additional increases in infrastructure investment. Beyond that (for  
), the extra marginal productivity gains induced by additional investments tend
to slow down or to disappear. This can be captured by assuming that the degree of
eﬃciency of infrastructure is nonlinearly related to the (congestion-adjusted) stock of
public capital itself.37
The aggregate production function therefore takes the form, instead of (8),
 = [( ) ]  (48)
where (0) = 1,  0  0, and  00  0 for  ≤ , and  00  0 for   . Thus,
network eﬀects take a convex form. To fix ideas, we set ( ) = ( ), where   1
over the range  ∈ (0 ) and  = 0 for   .
It is straightforward to show that the steady-state solutions (26) and (27) for 
and  remain the same (which implies, in particular, that neither  nor  aﬀects the
threshold values of  in the basic framework), whereas (28) is replaced by
1 +  =
½
()(1+)[Λ1 − (1− )˜]1−(1+) ˜ ∈ (0 )
()[Λ1 − (1− )˜]1− ˜   
Based on this solution, and the results of the previous section, the following propo-
sition can be established.
Proposition 5. If ˜ ∈ (0 ), and network externalities are suﬃciently strong
(   −1− 1), a low (high) debt equilibrium under the golden rule is associated with a
low (high) steady-state growth rate of output.
37See for instance Agénor (2010). Evidence of threshold eﬀects in the relationship between output
growth and infrastructure is provided by Röller and Waverman (2001), Égert et al. (2009), Czernich
et al. (2011), Roberts and Deichmann (2011), Candelon et al. (2013), and Agénor and Neanidis
(2015).
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Based on the long-run value estimated by Bom and Ligthart (2014, Table 4), using
meta-regression analysis for core public capital at the national level,  = 017; the
restriction on  is thus   488. However, based on the central simultaneous-equation
estimate of Agénor and Neanidis (2015),  = 026 and the condition is   284; at the
higher end of their estimates,  = 038, the condition becomes   163. And based
on the estimates of the elasticity of output to infrastructure reported in European
Commission (2014, Appendix 3), which vary between 006 to 084, at the upper range
of these values the condition is only   019.
Thus, the steady-state growth rate of output may now be positively related to the
debt-private capital ratio. Intuitively, this result holds because with network exter-
nalities, and with the marginal product of private capital depending positively on the
available stock of public capital, the crowding-in eﬀect is stronger–at least up to a
certain level of the public-private capital ratio. In addition, the eﬀect of a shift in the
share of spending on investment on growth is now magnified. As with partial depre-
ciation, this result may be useful to explain the ambiguous empirical evidence on the
link between public debt and growth.
However, with  high enough, the high-debt, high-growth equilibrium (Point 0 in
Figure 1) remains unstable; unless the economy starts there, it cannot be reached over
time. Suppose instead that the initial equilibrium is at Point , which (again, with
 high enough) is now a low-debt, low-growth equilibrium. Because, as shown earlier,
this equilibrium exists only when   
¯¯2
=1, an increase in the share of investment
to exactly 
¯¯2
=1 will shift the economy from Point  to Point , an equilibrium
characterized by higher growth and a higher debt-private capital ratio.
An obvious question, of course, is whether Point  is preferable to Point  (or
any point located to the Northeast of , corresponding to a higher ), from a welfare
point of view. Intuitively, the output growth eﬀect, which is positive, is likely to be
welfare-improving. At the same time, however, higher debt means a higher burden on
future generations, and this may be welfare reducing. In general, therefore, whether
an equilibrium with higher debt and higher growth is preferable to an equilibrium
with low debt and low growth (such as Point ) from a welfare standpoint is likely
to be ambiguous. This result is formally established in Appendix 2, where the welfare
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analysis is restricted to the balanced growth path. However, as also shown in Appendix
2, the stronger the network externality, the more likely it is that the net welfare eﬀect
will be positive, reflecting the strength of the growth eﬀect. In addition, the condition
established in Proposition 5 is suﬃcient, although not necessary, for the welfare eﬀect
to be unambiguously positive.38
These simple results have important practical implications for industrial countries
and for those developing countries where market-based bond financing of public deficits
is a viable option. For the latter group of countries, where stocks of infrastructure
are relatively low to begin with, there is strong evidence to suggest that network
eﬀects associated with additional investment are likely to be strong across a broad
range of infrastructure assets. For industrial countries, even though these externalities
in “basic” infrastructure such as roads and telecommunications may have long been
exhausted, there are certain types of infrastructure for which they are likely to remain
powerful–in particular, high-speed rail, air-traﬃc control systems, and high-speed
broadband. In the case of broadband, studies by the European Union have shown that
the replacement of aging copper networks with next-generation optic fiber networks
could have a substantial impact on growth.39
Even though sustainability considerations may impose limits on all types of spend-
ing, our results illustrate the importance of preserving, even in a context of fiscal
retrenchment, the allocation of resources to specific types of public investment–those
with potentially strong externalities with respect to private production. In fact, ex-
ternalities associated with infrastructure may exist not only with respect to its impact
on the production of goods, but also (as is the case for broadband, for instance) for
the production of human capital and the capacity to innovate–both of which likely to
38Adding a utility benefit to public capital (improved access to faster transportation may enhance
leisure, for instance) implies that the net welfare gain would be more likely to be positive. Doing
so would not aﬀect the derivations provided earlier, as long as it is introduced additively in the
household utility function. Conversely, however, if unproductive spending  were to aﬀect utility,
under a generalized golden rule an increase in  would lower  (as implied by (46)), and the change
in welfare would be ambiguous.
39In principle, to account for the possibility that network externalities may exist only for a cer-
tain category of infrastructure assets, we should introduce two types of infrastructure in the model.
However, this would only complicate the analysis without adding any insight.
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promote growth.40
5 Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this paper was to analyze the dynamics of public debt in a simple
two-period overlapping generations model of endogenous growth with productive pub-
lic goods. Considering first a basic framework, alternative fiscal rules were defined,
including a golden rule whereby investment in infrastructure, and interest payments
on public debt, were financed by issuing bonds. Conditions under which a single equi-
librium and multiple equilibria may emerge were characterized. It was also shown
that the steady-state relationship between output growth and the debt-private capital
ratio is unambiguously negative under the golden rule, implying that, with multiple
equilibria, the low- (high-) debt equilibrium is associated with a higher (lower) growth
rate. Intuitively, an increase in the share of public spending on investment has two
opposite eﬀects on fiscal sustainability. On the one hand, it raises the public capital
stock, improves productivity of private inputs, and raises the accumulation of private
capital, thereby promoting the rate of economic growth. On the other, it results in
higher interest rates and leads to more public debt accumulation. This has a nega-
tive impact on fiscal sustainability due to the crowding-out of private capital, and this
hampers growth. However, even though the growth rate and the public debt-private
capital ratio are inversely related in the steady state, it was shown that an increase in
the share of investment in infrastructure has an ambiguous eﬀect on long-run growth:
on the one hand, it raises the debt-private capital ratio, which tends to lower growth;
on the other, it raises the public-private capital ratio, both directly and indirectly. If
the elasticity of output with respect to public capital is suﬃciently high, the steady-
state growth rate of output will increase. This result was established because, unlike
previous studies, a proper distinction was made between the elasticities of output with
respect to labor and public capital.
The analysis was then extended to consider the case of partial depreciation, an
endogenous risk premium, an endogenous primary surplus rule, a generalized golden
40See Agénor (2012) and Agénor and Neanidis (2015) for a discussion and empirical evidence.
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rule, and network externalities. With an endogenous risk premium, the higher the
sensitivity of that premium to the debt-private capital ratio, the more likely it is that
multiple equilibria will emerge if the steady-state value of that ratio is less than unity;
in contrast, if the debt-private capital ratio is too high, it is more likely that there
may be no equilibria. With the generalized golden rule, the crowding-out eﬀect on
private capital formation associated with public debt accumulation is magnified, as a
result of a direct eﬀect on transfers and household savings. The higher the proportion
of interest payments financed by tax revenues, the higher is the (sustainable) share
of these revenues that the government can spend on infrastructure–despite the fact
that this increase lowers the share of other spending, including transfers, and thus
private savings and investment. With network externalities, the qualitative features
of the dynamics of the debt-private capital ratio do not change, but a steady-state
characterized by high growth and high public debt can now emerge if network eﬀects are
suﬃciently strong. This is in contrast to the inverse steady-state relationship between
output growth and the debt-private capital ratio obtained in the basic framework and
the rest of the literature. A large enough increase in the share of output allocated to
public investment may shift the economy from a low-growth, low-debt equilibrium to
an equilibrium characterized by both higher debt and higher growth. This shift may
be welfare-enhancing as well, particularly so if in addition to its productivity eﬀects
public capital generates some utility benefits.
Despite the simplicity of the model, these results have important implications for
the current debate on fiscal consolidation and growth, especially in industrial countries.
Even though network externalities may have long been exhausted for many types of
“basic” infrastructure assets, they are likely to remain strong for some specific types,
such as high speed rail and broadband. And if indeed these eﬀects are strong, the
analysis in this paper illustrates the importance of preserving, even in a context of fiscal
consolidation, a suﬃcient level of public investment. A well-designed fiscal adjustment
program can both promote growth and ensure fiscal sustainability in the long run.
The analysis can be extended in several directions. In particular, alternative fiscal
rules can be studied, along the lines of Turnovsky (1997), Bohn (1998), Buiter (2004),
Annichiarico and Giammarioli (2008), Futagami et al. (2008), Fernández-Huertas and
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Vidal (2010), and Michel et al. (2010), who consider endogenous responses of both
spending (especially unproductive outlays) and tax rates to deviations in the debt-
output ratio. A broader focus on diﬀerent ways of financing productive government
spending, would indeed help to shed light on some of the policy options that govern-
ments often face in practice.41 In the present case, if the tax rate increases suﬃciently
rapidly with the debt-output ratio (or deviations in that ratio from its steady-state
value), as in a “spend and tax” approach, the transition curve  () in (24) may turn
concave–ensuring therefore a stable, single long-run equilibrium. Such feedback rules
may be part of balanced-budget rules, which are the most common in practice. Intu-
itively, it is likely that with feedback rules of this type stability will depend critically on
what the target level of the debt-output ratio is. However, the possibility of multiple
equilibria (some of them unstable) will also remain.
41In this context, political economy considerations focusing on conflicts between young and old on
ways to finance productive spending may be important. See Song et al. (2012) and Lancia and Russo
(2013). In the latter paper for instance, the middle aged support productive investment (in education)
today, even though they do not benefit from it directly, because they want to ensure that the tax base
is suﬃciently large next period (when they are old) to finance transfers.
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Appendix 1
This Appendix discusses in more detail the case of partial depreciation rates for
public and private capital and considers briefly the case of a nonseparable utility func-
tion. To simplify matters, these extensions are considered separately.
Consider first partial depreciation of private and public capital. Using (33), equa-
tion (17) is thus replaced by
+1 = Λ1 − (1 + ) + (1−  ) 
where Λ1 is defined in the text. Using again (33), equation (19) becomes
+1
 = Λ1(
 ) − (1− )( ) + 1−   (A1)
Similarly, from (8), (10), and (32), equation (20) becomes
+1
 = (

 ) + 1− 
 = ( )−1 + 1−  (A2)
Dividing (A2) by (A1) gives
+1 =  + (1− 
)( )1−
Λ1 − (1− ) + (1−  )( )−  (A3)
The equation that determines the dynamics of public debt, (22), remains the same:
+1
 = [(1− )− Λ2
−1 ]( ) (A4)
where Λ2 is defined in the text. Dividing (A4) by (A1) gives now
+1 = (1− ) − Λ2Λ1 − (1− ) + (1−  )( )−  (A5)
Equations (A3) and (A5) represent a highly nonlinear system, whose steady-state
solution is given by
˜ −  + (1− 
)(˜)1−
Λ = 0 (A6)
˜− (1− )˜− Λ2Λ = 0 (A7)
where
Λ = Λ1 − (1− )˜+ (1−  )(˜)−
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In general this system cannot be solved analytically. Equation (A6) can be re-
arranged as
˜ = Λ1
(1− ) −

(1− )˜ +
 − 
(1− )(˜)  (A8)
with lim˜→∞ ˜ = Λ1(1−). Again, by applying the implicit function theorem, it can
be established that (A8) gives an increasing but nonmonotonic relationship between ˜
and ˜, depending on the sign of  −  . Thus, the steady-state conditions (A7) and
(A8) may now be highly nonlinear in the ˜-˜ space, implying again that depending
not only on how low  and  are (compared to the benchmark case of  =  = 1),
but also on the sign of −  , more than two equilibria may emerge. To characterize
these equilibria a numerical analysis is needed.
With  = 1 and   1, the steady-state solution of (36) is given by
(˜ ˜) = ˜ [Λ1 − (1− )˜]− (1− )(˜)1− −  = 0
from which it can be established that ˜  0 and ˜ ≷ 0, depending, in particular,
on the values of  and . Thus, assuming that ˜ 6= 0, the implicit function theorem
implies that now ˜˜ ≷ 0.
Suppose now that the period utility function, instead of (1), takes a constant relative
risk aversion (CRRA) form, with the household therefore solving the problem
max
+1
 = (
)1−
−1
1− −1 + Ω
(+1)1−−1
1− −1 
where Ω = 1(1 + ) is the discount factor and  the elasticity of intertemporal sub-
stitution. The budget constraint remains the same as (5). Solving the household’s
optimization problem, it can be shown in standard fashion that the savings rate is
no longer constant; it is given by  = (+1), from which it can be established that
+1  0 if   1, whereas +1  0 if   1. Thus, the eﬀect of the interest
rate on savings is generally ambiguous, which reflects the fact that the substitution
and income eﬀects on consumption of a change in the interest rate operate in opposite
directions.
Explicit analytical solutions cannot be established in this case but intuitively the
implications of an endogenous savings rate are fairly clear. Let us consider the conven-
tional case where an increase in the interest rate therefore raises savings and, given the
definition of Λ1 in (18), private capital accumulation. From (6) and (8), the interest
rate is a linear function of the public-private capital ratio. In turn, from (21) and (24),
both +1 and +1 depend on  ; the dynamics of the public debt-private capital ratio
and public-private capital ratio are now interdependent. In particular, the steady-state
equations (26) and (27) are replaced by
(1− )˜2 − [Λ1(˜)− (1− )]˜− Λ2 = 0 (A9)
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˜ [Λ1(˜)− (1− )˜]−  = 0 (A10)
where now Λ1˜  0. These equations must be solved numerically to determine
whether multiple equilibria can emerge. Even though it can be established (by applying
the implicit function theorem) that the second equation implies that ˜ = Φ(˜), with
Φ0  0, both curves may now be highly nonlinear in the ˜-˜ space, implying that if
the sensitivity of  with respect to the interest rate is high, more than two equilibria
may emerge. Conversely, as can be inferred from (18), the endogeneity of  has limited
impact on the analysis if (1− ) +  is close to zero; however, this implies (1 −
) = 1, a condition that cannot be fulfilled given the restrictions on  ,  and 
being all less than unity.
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Appendix 2
This Appendix examines the eﬀect of an increase in the infrastructure spending
share on welfare, along the balanced growth path. In standard fashion, assume that
the government’s welfare function is a discounted sum of the utility of the representative
individual of the present and all future generations,  = P∞=0 where  ∈ (0 1)
is a constant discount factor which reflects social time preferences and may diﬀer from
each individual’s subjective discount factor.
From (1), the utility function can be written as
 = ln  + Γ1 ln +1 (B1)
where Γ1 = 1(1 + ). From (2), (6), and (14),  can be written as
 = Γ2 (B2)
where
Γ2 = (1− ) [(1− ) + ]
Similarly, from (3), (6), (8), and (14) yields
+1 = Γ3(+1) (B3)
where
Γ3 = (1− ) [(1− ) + ]
Substituting (B2) and (B3) in (B1) implies that the representative individual’s
lifetime utility is
 = Γ4 + (1 + Γ1) ln + Γ1 ln +1
where
Γ4 = lnΓ2 + Γ1 lnΓ3
Along the balanced growth path, the public-private capital stock is constant at ˜ ,
as shown in the text. The above expression becomes
˜ = Γ4 + (1 + Γ1) ln ˜ + Γ1 ln ˜ 
In addition, along the steady-state equilibrium path, ˜ = 0(1 + ). Substituting
this result in the above expression yields
˜ = Γ5 + (1 + Γ1) ln(1 + ) + Γ1 ln ˜  (B4)
where
Σ5 = Σ4 + (1 + Σ1) ln0
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This expression implies that welfare is increasing in the growth rate 1+ , given in
(28), and depends on time. From (27) and (28),
1 +  = (˜)[Λ1 − (1− )˜] 
Substituting this expression in (B4) yields
˜ = Σ5 +  [(1 + Σ1)+ Σ1] ln ˜ + (1 + Σ1) ln[Λ1 − (1− )˜] (B5)
Equation (27) can be rewritten as [Λ1 − (1− )˜] = (˜)−1. Substituting this
result again in (B5) yields now
˜ = Γ5 + [(− 1)(1 + Γ1)+ Γ1] ln ˜ + (1 + Γ1) ln  (B6)
Consider first the case where → 0. Expression (B6) boils down to
˜0 = Γ5 + Γ1 ln ˜ 
As discussed in the text, under all the fiscal rules considered in the paper, an
increase in  unambiguously increases ˜ . Thus, under the (interest-inclusive) golden
rule, under which  = 1 and Γ5 = 0, investing more today increases welfare
unambiguously if the government is concerned only with the welfare of the present
generation. However, note that with the generalized golden rule, the condition  = 1
does not hold anymore, and Γ5  0. Thus, even if the government is concerned
only with the welfare of the present generation, higher  does not necessarily imply
an increase in welfare.
Consider now the case where   0. Inspection of (B6) shows that an increase
in  raises the last term directly. Under the (interest-inclusive) golden rule, again,
Γ5 = 0. In addition, an increase in  (as noted earlier) increases ˜ . However,
whether the second term in (B6) is positive or negative depends on the sign of ( −
1)(1 +Γ1)+Γ1, and thus also on . If  is suﬃciently less than one, for  given, this
term can be negative. If it exceeds the third term, then the net eﬀect on welfare can
be negative. Conversely, if  is suﬃciently high, the net welfare eﬀect will be positive.
Intuitively, the source of the ambiguity is due to the fact that the burden of debt is
shifted across generations, which ensures that the “crowding out” eﬀect perpetuates
itself. Unless the growth (or “crowding in”) eﬀect of public capital is strong, future
generations are worse oﬀ as a result.
Finally, note that if there are network externalities, the term − 1 in (B6) would
be replaced by (1+ )− 1. If so, the stronger the network externality, the more likely
it is that the net welfare eﬀect will be positive, reflecting the strength of the growth
eﬀect. In addition, (1 + )  1 is a suﬃcient (although not necessary) for the welfare
eﬀect to be unambiguously positive.
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Table 1
Parameter Values
Parameter Value Description
 056 Adjusted savings rate
 036 Eﬀective tax rate (adjusted for labor share)
 052 Share of transfers in unproductive public spending
 0052 Share of investment in total public spending
 0 to 1 Share of investment financed by issuing bonds
 0 to 1 Share of interest payments financed by issuing bonds
 07 Labor elasticity of output
 017 Elasticity of output to public capital, base case
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Figure 2
Equilibria and Threshold Shares of Public Investment
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Figure 3
Golden Rule: Multiple Steady-State Equilibria 
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Figure 4
Increase in Investment Spending on Infrastructure 
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